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1 Introduction
Background and Purpose
At the beginning of the 21 st century, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) began the task of providing cryptographic key management guidance. This included lessons learned over many years of dealing with key management issues and is intended to 1) encourage the specification and implementation of appropriate key management procedures, 2) use algorithms that adequately protect sensitive information, and 3) plan ahead for possible changes in the use of cryptography because of algorithm breaks or the availability of more powerful computing techniques.
General key management guidance, including the general approach for transitioning from one algorithm or key length to another, is addressed in Part 1 of Special Publication (SP) 800-57 .
This Recommendation (SP 800-131A) is intended to provide more detail about the transitions associated with the use of cryptography by Federal government agencies for the protection of sensitive, but unclassified information. The Recommendation addresses the use of algorithms and key lengths SP 800-131A was originally published in January 2011. This revision updates the transition guidance provided in the previous version; these changes are listed in Appendix C. The most significant difference is the deprecation of the non-approved key-agreement and key-transport schemes through December 31, 2017, and the intent to disallow them thereafter.
Although transition dates are provided in , this document (i.e., SP 800-131A) is intended to provide more detailed information that deals with the realities associated with an orderly transition. Note that an upper-date limit is not provided herein for many of the algorithms and key lengths discussed; that information is provided in , and should be considered valid unless different guidance is provided in the future.
1.2
Useful Terms for Understanding this Recommendation
Security Strengths
Some of the guidance provided in includes the definition of security strengths, the association of the approved algorithms and key lengths with these security strengths, and a projection of the time frames during which the algorithms and key lengths could be expected to provide adequate security. Note that the length of the cryptographic keys is an integral part of these determinations.
In , the security strength provided by an algorithm with a particular key length 1 is measured in bits and is a measure of the difficulty of subverting the cryptographic protection that is provided by the algorithm and key. A security strength for each algorithm is provided in . This is the estimated maximum security strength that an algorithm with a particular key length can provide, given that the key used with that algorithm has sufficient entropy 2 .
The appropriate security strength to be used depends on the sensitivity of the data being protected, and needs to be determined by the owner of that data (e.g., a person or an organization). For the Federal government, a minimum security strength of 112 bits is required for applying cryptographic protection (e.g., for encrypting or signing data). Note that prior to 2014, a security strength of 80 bits was approved for applying these protections, and the transitions in this document reflect this change to a strength of 112 bits. However, a large quantity of data was protected at the 80-bit security strength and may need to be processed (e.g., decrypted or have a digital signature verified). The processing of this already-protected data at the lower security strength is allowed, but a certain amount of risk must be accepted. 
Definition of Terms
The terms "approved", "acceptable", "deprecated", "restricted", "legacy-use" and "disallowed" are used throughout this Recommendation.
• Approved is used to mean that an algorithm is specified in a FIPS or NIST Recommendation (published as a NIST Special Publication).
• Acceptable is used to mean that the algorithm and key length is safe to use; no security risk is currently known.
• Deprecated means that the use of the algorithm and key length is allowed, but the user must accept some risk. The term is used when discussing the key lengths or algorithms that may be used to apply cryptographic protection to data (e.g., encrypting or generating a digital signature).
• Restricted means that the use of the algorithm or key length is deprecated, and there are additional restrictions required to use the algorithm or key length for applying cryptographic protection to data (e.g., encrypting).
• Legacy-use means that the algorithm or key length may be used to process already protected information (e.g., to decrypt ciphertext data or to verify a digital signature), but there may be a risk in doing so.
• Disallowed means that the algorithm or key length is no longer allowed for the indicated use.
The use of algorithms and key lengths for which the terms deprecated, restricted and legacy-use are listed require that the user must accept some risk that increases over time. If a user determines that the risk is unacceptable, then the algorithm or key length is considered disallowed, from the perspective of that user. It is the responsibility of the user or the user's organization to determine the level of risk that can be tolerated for an application and its associated data and to define any methods for mitigating those risks.
Other cryptographic terms used in this Recommendation are defined in the documents listed in Appendix B.
The following symbol has been used in this Recommendation:
len(x) The length of an integer x in bits.
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Encryption and Decryption Using Block Cipher Algorithms
Encryption is a cryptographic operation that is used to provide confidentiality for sensitive information, and decryption is the inverse operation. Several block cipher algorithms have been approved for use by the Federal government:
• TDEA (Triple Data Encryption Algorithm; often referred to as Triple DES) is specified in , and has two variations, known as two-key TDEA and three-key TDEA. Three-key TDEA is the stronger of the two variations.
• SKIPJACK was approved in [FIPS 185 ]. However, approval for the use of SKIPJACK is being withdrawn, as its security strength is now considered inadequate.
• AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) is specified in [FIPS 197 ] and has three approved key lengths: 128, 192 and 256 bits.
See for more information about the security strengths provided by these algorithms.
Note that encryption and decryption using these algorithms require the use of modes of operation. Some of these modes also provide authentication when performing encryption, and provide verification when performing decryption on the encrypted and authenticated information (see and [SP 800-38D]).
The approval status of the block cipher encryption/decryption algorithms is provided in Table 1 . Through December 31, 2015, the use of two-key TDEA for encryption is restricted: the total number of blocks of data encrypted with the same cryptographic key shall not be greater than 2 20 (note that for this algorithm, a block is the 64-bit block of a TDEA encryption operation).
After December 31, 2015, the use of two-key TDEA for encryption is disallowed. Decryption using two-key TDEA is allowed for legacy-use.
SKIPJACK encryption and decryption:
The use of SKIPJACK for encryption is disallowed.
The use of SKIPJACK for decryption is allowed for legacy-use.
AES and three-key TDEA encryption and decryption:
The use of AES-128, AES-192, AES-256 and three-key TDEA is acceptable.
Digital Signatures
Digital signatures are used to provide assurance of origin authentication and data integrity. These assurances are sometimes extended to provide assurance that a party in a dispute (the signatory) cannot repudiate (i.e., refute) the validity of the signed document; this is commonly known as non-repudiation. The digital signature algorithms approved in are DSA, ECDSA and RSA.
The generation of a digital signature on data requires the use of 1) a cryptographic hash function that operates on the data to be signed, and 2) the use of a cryptographic key and a signing algorithm to generate a signature on the output of the hash function (and, by extension, the data that is intended to be signed). This section addresses the use of the cryptographic keys used with the signing algorithm. Discussions of the hash function to be used during the generation of digital signatures are provided in Section 9. The details of the security strengths of the algorithms and the key lengths used can be found in .
Note that the security strength of a digital signature algorithm is no greater than the minimum of 1) the security strength that can be supported by the cryptographic keys used to generate signatures, and 2) the security strength (with respect to collision resistance) of the cryptographic hash function that operates on the data to be signed. The current approval status for DRBGs is provided in Table 3 . Other key agreement schemes that are not specified in SP 800-56A are allowed by the FIPS 140 Implementation Guideline [IG D.8]; these will be discussed below as the deprecated schemes. They are disallowed after 2017. Table 4 contains the approval status for DH and MQV key agreement schemes. Acceptable SP 800-56A DH and MQV schemes using elliptic curves < 112 bits of security strength: 160 ≤ len(n) < 224 Disallowed ≥ 112 bits of security strength: len(n) ≥ 224 AND len(h) as specified in Table 5 Acceptable Non-compliant DH and MQV schemes using finite fields < 112 bits of security strength: SP 800-56A DH and MQV schemes using finite fields:
The use of the finite field schemes in SP 800-56A is acceptable if len(p) ≥ 2048 and len(q) ≥ 224. Otherwise, their use is disallowed.
SP 800-56A DH and MQV schemes using elliptic curves:
In [SP 800-56A], five parameter sets are defined: EA -EE. Except for the EA parameter set, all of them define acceptable ECC parameter sizes. The acceptable values for len(n) and len(h) are provided in the following table. Non-compliant DH and MQV schemes using finite fields:
The use of these schemes is disallowed if len(p) < 2048 or len(q) < 224.
Through December 31, 2017, the use of these schemes is deprecated if len(p) ≥ 2048 and len(q) ≥ 224. All of these schemes are disallowed after 2017.
Non-compliant DH and MQV schemes using elliptic curves:
The use of these schemes is disallowed if len(n) < 224.
Through December 31, 2017, the use of these schemes is deprecated if len(n) ≥ 224. All of these schemes are disallowed after 2017. Guidance on approved key lengths for RSA is provided in [SP 800-56B]. Table 6 provides the approval status.
In the case of key transport keys (i.e., the keys used to encrypt other keys for transport), this Recommendation (SP 800-131A) applies to both the encryption and decryption of the transported keys. The use of these schemes is disallowed if len(n) < 2048.
The use of these schemes is acceptable if len(n) ≥ 2048.
Non-56B-compliant RSA Key Transport schemes:
The use of these schemes is disallowed if len(n) < 2048.
Through December 31, 2017, the use of these schemes is deprecated if len(n)≥ 2048.
The use of these schemes is disallowed after December 31, 2017. 
Scheme Use

Key Wrapping
Key wrapping is the encryption of keying material by a symmetric key with integrity protection.
[SP 800-38F] specifies three algorithms for key wrapping that use block ciphers: KW (AES Key Wrap) and KWP (AES Key Wrap with Padding), which use AES, and TKW (Triple DEA Key Wrap), which uses TDEA.
[SP 800-38F] also approves the CCM (Counter with Cipher Block Chaining-Message Authentication Code) and GCM (Galois Counter Mode) authenticated-encryption modes specified in [SP 800-38C] and [SP 800-38D] for key wrapping, as well as combinations of an approved encryption mode with an approved authentication method. Table 7 provides the approval status of the block cipher algorithms used for key wrapping. Through December 31, 2015, the use of two-key TDEA for key wrapping is restricted: the total number of blocks of data wrapped with the same cryptographic key shall not be greater than 2 20 (note that for this algorithm, a block is the 64-bit block of a TDEA encryption operation). Two-key TDEA shall not be used to wrap keying material after December 31, 2015.
The use of two-key TDEA for unwrapping keying material using approved methods is allowed for legacy-use.
AES and three-key TDEA:
AES and three-key TDEA are acceptable for both the wrapping and unwrapping of keying material using approved methods.
Symmetric-key wrapping methods not approved by [SP 800-38F]:
Symmetric-key-wrapping methods that are not compliant with [SP 800-38F] are disallowed after December 31, 2017.
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Deriving Additional Keys from a Cryptographic Key specifies key derivation functions that use a pre-shared cryptographic key (called a key derivation key) to generate additional keys. Note that key derivation methods used within key-agreement schemes are not relevant to this section. Table 8 provides the approval status of the key lengths used for key derivation. The use of HMAC-based KDFs is acceptable using an approved hash function, including SHA-1. See Section 10 for discussions of the key lengths used with HMAC.
CMAC-based KDF:
The use of two-key TDEA as the block cipher algorithm in a CMAC-based KDF is deprecated through December 31, 2015.
Two-key TDEA shall not be used to derive keying material after December 31, 2015.
The use of AES and three-key TDEA as the block cipher algorithm in a CMAC-based KDF is acceptable.
Hash Functions
Seven approved hash functions are specified in , and four additional approved hash functions are specified in [FIPS 202] . The security strengths for hash functions are dependent on their use, and this information is provided in . Additional discussions about the different uses of the SHA-1 and SHA-2 hash functions specified in are provided in , while discussions about the SHA-3 hash functions specified in [FIPS 202] are provided in that FIPS. Note that [FIPS 202 ] also specifies extendable output functions (XOFs); however, these are not approved as hash functions, and their use is not included in this section 4 . Table 9 provides the approval status of the approved hash functions. SHA-1 may only be used for digital signature generation where specifically allowed by NIST protocol-specific guidance. For all other applications, SHA-1 shall not be used for digital signature generation.
SHA-1 for digital signature verification:
For digital signature verification, SHA-1 is allowed for legacy-use. 4 The approved uses of XOFs will be addressed in future publications.
Hash Function Use
SHA-1
Digital signature generation Disallowed, except where specifically allowed by NIST protocol-specific guidance. The use of these hash functions is acceptable for all hash function applications.
SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, and SHA3-512:
The use of these hash functions is acceptable for all hash function applications. Figure 10 provides the approval status for the approved MAC algorithms. The use of key lengths ≥ 112 bits is acceptable.
Message Authentication Codes (MACs)
HMAC Verification:
The use of key lengths < 112 bits is allowed for legacy-use.
The use of key lengths ≥ 112 bits is acceptable.
CMAC Generation:
Through December 31, 2015, the use of two-key TDEA for CMAC generation is restricted: the total number of blocks of data using the same cryptographic key shall not be greater than 2 20 (note that for this algorithm, a block is the 64-bit block of a TDEA encryption operation).
The use of two-key TDEA for CMAC generation is disallowed after December 31, 2015.
The use of AES or three-key TDEA for CMAC generation is acceptable.
CMAC Verification:
The use of two-key TDEA for CMAC verification is allowed for legacy-use.
The use of AES or three-key TDEA for CMAC verification is acceptable.
GMAC Generation and Verification:
The use of GMAC for MAC generation and verification is acceptable when using AES.
As in the case of block cipher algorithms used for encryption, the same key is used to generate the MAC as must be used for verification of that MAC. Since the algorithm and key length used to generate that MAC are no longer considered secure, an entity that verifies a MAC using a nolonger-secure algorithm and key length should assume that an adversary may be capable of determining the key that was used for MAC generation. During the "legacy-use" period, the adversary may be assumed to be capable of determining the MAC key and generating MACs on new messages or substituting more beneficial messages (beneficial to the adversary) that produce the same MAC.
In order for the MACed data to continue to be verifiable as valid during the "legacy-use" period, both the MACed data and the MAC need to be protected against possible modification or substitution (e.g., placed in secure storage).
A.3 Digital Signature Verification Using Asymmetric (Public) Keys
The rules specified in this publication require that digital signatures are generated using keys that provide at least 112 bits of security strength. However, before the end of 2013, the use of keys that provided only 80 bits of security strength was approved.
While it is possible to disallow the use of the low-strength keys and hash functions when generating new signatures, it is also necessary to deal with the existence of a large set of alreadygenerated signatures that need to be verified. Hence, this publication specifies different feasible strengths of keys and an unlimited use of the SHA-1 hash function when it is used for digital signature verification of previously approved key lengths.
There are, however, risks involved that must be understood by the verifying user. The signature verification procedure might work, but since the document was signed by a key that is now considered weak, its integrity and the authenticity of the signatory could be compromised. For example, an attacker might be able to use the signatory's public key and the publicly known set of domain parameters and determine the private key used for signature generation, due to its low security strength. The attacker could then alter the original document and sign it using the discovered private key. Other related attacks are also possible.
Therefore, while it is necessary to allow the use of weaker keys to verify the existing signatures, it is also important to remind the user to remember the risk of verifying the wrong one.
